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James C. Ish

A ROAD MAP TO RESTORING RIVERS:
HOW THE KLAMATH BASIN RESTORATION AGREEMENT MIGHT
INFLUENCE FUTURE DAM REMOVAL AND RIVER RESTORATION
PROJECTS.
ABSTRACT
Throughout the United States dams are approaching the terminus
of their original licensing periods and are undergoing re-licensing
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. This period of
review has prompted extensive studies in these basins to determine
the cost-benefits associated with keeping these dams, versus
removing and restoring the natural ecosystems that are currently
inundated. In situations where a dam is deemed to be no longer
economically relevant, and/or a detriment to endangered species
or their critical habitat, an agreement for removal and restoration
is often proposed as the next step in the management of that
basin’s water resources. However, agreements to remove dams
and restore aquatic habitat have been difficult to draft and finalize
due in part to the wide spectrum of positions held by stakeholders,
along with the incredible financial cost and liability involved with
such an undertaking. This paper discusses the past, present, and
future outlook of four such dams on the Klamath River in
California and Oregon. In particular, this paper analyzes several
revolutionary tactics that were used in drafting the final
agreement between parties which have the potential to improve the
process of future negotiations and subsequent agreements in other
basins around the United States.
The Western United States has a unique and complicated history with dams.
With its dramatically varying climates and low levels of annual precipitation, the arid
West would not have developed into the agricultural powerhouse that it is today, nor
would some of the largest cities in the nation such as Las Vegas, Los Angeles, or
Phoenix exist as they do today, without dams that provide drinking water, irrigation,
and power to millions.1 Many of the large, well-known western dams such as Grand
Coulee, Shasta, Hoover, and Glen Canyon were built by the federal government to
support western expansion. Created by the signing of the 1902 Reclamation Act, the
U.S. Reclamation Service (later renamed the Bureau of Reclamation) would become
1. See generally Water in the West, Bureau of Reclamation Historic Dams and Water Projects,
Managing
Water
in
the
West,
available
at
https://www.nps.gov/nr/testing/ReclamationDamsAndWaterProjects/Water_In_The_West.html.
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the federal agency synonymous with the West and would go on to construct 492
dams, becoming the largest wholesale water supplier and the second largest producer
of hydroelectric power in the United States.2 Public utility companies followed suit,
constructing dams with the mission of generating hydroelectric power for households
and municipalities. During the Great Depression, construction of dams by the federal
government became a central piece of the “prime the pump” economic stimulus
initiative to re-energize the American economy.3
Dams built in the American West became symbols of American pride,
progress, and a national realization of Manifest Destiny in the early decades of 20th
century.4 However, for many, dam development was the beginning of largescale
environmental degradation. John Muir famously fought the construction of the
O’Shaughnessy Dam, which was planned to be built in one of the most stunning
valleys of the West. Often called the twin of Yosemite Valley, Hetch Hetchy Valley
was renowned for its stunning granite walls, diverse wildlife, and the Tuolumne
River which teamed with native fish.5 The O’Shaughnessy Dam was approved by
Congress in 1913, and was completed in 1923.6 Despite the efforts of Muir and the
Sierra Club, the Hetch Hetchy Valley was lost in the name of progress and
development.7 The Hetch Hetchy Valley is maybe the most well-known example of
this struggle between environmentalists and pro-development interests, but it is
hardly the only example. The U.S. Army Corp of Engineers has cataloged over
91,468 dams in their National Inventory with an average age of 57 years old.8
Though these hydro-projects vary in scale and purpose, they all have impacts on the
natural environment where they were constructed.
The public perception of dams has evolved over many decades as the
ecological and environmental consequences associated with them have come to light.
Since 1999, more than 850 dams have been removed in an attempt to recover or
restore some semblance of the ecosystems that were lost.9 Today, the push to remove
dams whose environmental impacts outweigh their economic potential has increased
as our understanding of the importance of ecosystem services created by free-flowing
rivers continues to expand.
This paper discusses the proposed removal of four dams on the Klamath
River in California and Oregon, specifically focusing on the process of drafting the
agreement between parties for the removal of the dams. The final agreement
represents years of struggle, litigation, and gridlock between stakeholders who
finally found common ground, not just in the final terms of the agreement, but in the

2. U.S.
Bureau
of
Reclamation,
About
Us,
https://www.usbr.gov/main/about;
https://www.usbr.gov/main/about/fact.html
3. Supra note 1
4. Id.
5. See The Sierra Club, Hetch Hetchy: Time to Redeem a Historic Mistake,
vault.sierraclub.org/ca/hetchhetchy/.
6. The
Raker
Bill,
H.R.
7207,
63rd
Cong.
(1st
Sess.
1913),
http://www.sfmuseum.org/hetch/hetchy10.html.
7. See supra note 5.
8. USACE,
National
Inventory
of
Dams,
https://nid.sec.usace.army.mil/ords/f?p=105:113:3885584006591::NO:::.
9. Supra note 5.
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Upper Klamath Lake to the Pacific Ocean just north of Requa, California.13 This
arduous journey from summit to sea is far from simple. Along the way, the river
provides water to multiple states, tribes, municipalities, and industries for drinking,
irrigation, food, recreation, and hydroelectricity.14 Layered on top of state, tribal, and
private interests are the interests of five National Forests, the Bureau of Land
Management, and National Wildlife Refuges, all of which have tracts of land in and
around the basin. These tracts intersect the river basin and rely on the flows from the
Klamath and irrigation seepage to sustain their intended purposes.15
The Klamath is home to several species of endangered and threatened fish:
The Lost River16 and Shortnose suckers,17 which are managed by U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (USFWS) and the Southern Oregon/ Northern California Coast
(SONCC) Coho Salmon,18 which are managed by National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS).19 Furthermore, the salmon and suckers are sacred to tribes located in the
lower and upper basins of the Klamath. The Yurok, Karuk, and the Hoopa Valley
Tribes have relied on the annual migration of the Coho Salmon returning from the
ocean for hundreds of years. The Klamath Tribes, a federation of tribes located in
the upper basin, have similarly relied on the suckers as part of their traditional diet
for generations.20 These federally endangered species have collided head on with the
large power production facilities and a Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) irrigation
13. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, REPORT TO CONGRESS: SECURE WATER ACT SECTION
9503(C) – RECLAMATION CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER 131, 138 (2011).
14. See generally Adell L. Amos, Dam Removal and Hydropower Production in the United States Ushering in a New Era, 29 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1 (2014).
15. See generally David N. Allen, The Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement: Federal Law,
Local Compromise, and the Largest Dam Removal Project in History, 16 HASTINGS WEST NORTHWEST
J. OF ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 427 (2010).
16. Lost River Sucker (Deltistes luxatus) – Known as the “C’waam” by the Klamath Tribes, the Lost
River sucker is the largest of the sucker species around today and is a sacred animal to the tribes of the
Klamath Basin. This endangered species played a crucial role in providing food for the tribes along the
Klamath and its tributaries. For more information on the research and conservation efforts directed at this
species
see
Lost
River
Sucker,
U.S.
FISH
AND
WILDLIFE
SERVICE,
https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp0/profile/speciesProfile?spcode=E08A (last visited Oct. 20, 2020).
17. Shortnose Sucker (Chasmistes brevirostris) – Known as “Qapdo” by the Klamath Tribes, the
shortnose sucker is also considered a sacred species that has historically provided a reliable food source
for generations. With the construction of dams along the Klamath, cyanobacteria blooms became more
frequent in this species’ critical habitat, resulting in low dissolved oxygen concentrations. For more
information see TOMELLERI, J., U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., SHORTNOSE SUCKER (CHASMISTES
BREVIROSTRIS):
5-YEAR
REVIEW
SUMMARY
AND
EVALUATION
(2007)
https://ecos.fws.gov/docs/five_year_review/doc1063.pdf.
18. Coho Salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch) – Listed as ‘Threatened’ in this part of the country under
the ESA, the Coho Salmon play another critical role in providing food for native tribes as well as for
several large species of land fauna in the region. The Coho is generally regarded as a staple species of the
Pacific Northwest and a good indicator of overall environmental health. Low flows, siltation, and loss of
critical spawning habitat due to dams along the Klamath have resulted in a declining population. A fish
kill in the early 2000’s in the Klamath was reportedly one of the largest mass die-offs of Coho Salmon
ever recorded. See Coho Salmon, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/species/coho-salmon (last visited Oct. 20, 2020).
19. Coho
Salmon,
U.S.
FISH
AND
WILDLIFE
SERV.,
https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp0/profile/speciesProfile?spcode=E08A (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).
20. For more detail regarding the history of the Klamath Tribes see THE KLAMATH TRIBES:
KLAMATH, MODOC & YAHOOSKIN, History, https://klamathtribes.org/history/ (2020).
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dam, collectively known as the Klamath Hydropower Project (KHP). These dams
have significantly altered the hydrology of the river, resulting in disputes between
parties interested in water supply for endangered fish, wildlife refuges, irrigators,
and hydroelectric power producers.
The early 2000s saw the impracticality of continuing to operate and
maintain the four lower dams of the KHP become a reality for PacifiCorp, the
operator of the dams. PacifiCorp filed an application for a new license on February
25, 2004 to continue to operate the Klamath Project.21 The original license for the
project had been issued 50 years earlier on January 28, 195422 and was due to expire
on February 28, 2006.23 Congress tasked the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) with reviewing these applications. Subchapter I of the Federal Power Act
authorizes FERC to regulate the licensing, conditioning, and development of
hydropower projects on navigable waters of the United States.24 FERC commenced
the renewal process for the Klamath Project in February 2005, and in December 2005
issued a public notice that the application was ready for environmental review and
analysis.25 In November 2007, FERC issued their final Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) regarding the renewal application. Multiple alternatives were
discussed in the final EIS, ranging from renewal of the license with mandatory
mitigation measures, to decommissioning and removing the four lower dams of the
KHP.26 FERC ultimately recommended issuing a new license to PacifiCorp to
continue operation of the Klamath Project that included the four lower dams.27
However, this new license included several mitigation measures28 that would
ultimately force PacifiCorp to consider other alternatives.
The mitigation measures required by FERC’s final EIS included retrofitting
the dams for fish passage and reducing power production to meet minimum instreamflow requirements. Together, these measures would have PacifiCorp operating at a
net loss.29 These mandatory fishway prescriptions were filed by USFWS, NMFS,
and BLM in response to FERC releasing the license application for environmental
analysis. Once it was clear that FERC was not going to renew the licenses for these
facilities without substantial mitigation measures attached, a deal had to be made
between PacifiCorp, the Tribes, California, Oregon, irrigators, private stakeholders,
and the Federal Government regarding their decommission, and eventual removal of
the Klamath Project dams.30 PacifiCorp, however, was not the only stakeholder
21. See PacifCorp, [Order Amending License and Deferring Consideration of Transfer] Fed. Reg.
Comm’n Rep. (CCH) ¶ 61,236, 2 (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/commmeet/2018/031518/H-2.pdf.
22. Id. note 3, at 2. (“On June 16, 1961, the license was transferred to Pacific Power and Light
Company (25 FPC 1154) and then to PacifiCorp on November 23, 1988 (45 FERC 62,146).”)
23. 16 U.S.C § 808(a)(1) (2012).
24. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)-823(g) (2012).
25. PacifiCorp, 162 FERC ¶ 61,236 (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/commmeet/2018/031518/H-2.pdf.
26. FERC, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR RELICENSING OF THE KLAMATH
HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT NO. 2082-027 (2007).
27. Id.
28. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2012).
29. PacifiCorp, 162 FERC ¶ 61,236, 5 (Mar. 15, 2018).
30. Allen, supra note 15, at 432.

266

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 60.2

facing a new reality when it came to water management and the lengths that federal
agencies would go to ensure protection of listed species under the ESA.
Irrigators faced similar pressure to reach an agreement with the federal
government and the Tribes regarding water deliveries and maintaining safe water
levels for endangered fish. In 1992, the USBR produced its initial Biological
Assessment (BA), which proposed altering the delivery scheme to downstream
irrigators in the Klamath Basin out of concern that the current deliveries might be
threatening the Shortnose and Lost River suckers.31 The USBR was further
compelled to reduce downstream deliveries to irrigators after the findings of a
subsequent USFWS Biological Opinion (BO) concluded that continuing to operate
the Klamath Project in the existing manner would result in jeopardizing the two
species.32
In compliance with the BO, the USBR followed the Reasonable and Prudent
Alternatives (RPAs) prescribed by the USFWS and reduced downstream deliveries
to irrigation districts supplying irrigation water to farmers and ranchers.33 This
decision translated into economic hardship for the Lower Basin irrigators who
depended on the Klamath Reclamation Project.34 Without the KHP deliveries,
irrigators would be hard pressed to produce enough crops to make ends meet. This
controversial agency action was magnified when a devastating drought hit the region
in 2001.35 This drought was the perfect storm comprised of exceptionally low
amounts of precipitation and BAs and BOs that directed the USBR away from
irrigation delivery and towards maintaining ESA compliance. At the same time that
these BOs were to be released, an order issued by a federal court in California
reinforced the USBR’s duty to “comply with the ESA before delivering any Klamath
Project water for irrigation.”36 The concurrent issuance of stringent BOs by USFWS
and NMFS, combined with the federal court order, essentially left the USBR with no
other alternative but to put the needs of the fish above that of the irrigators. During
the drought, the USBR maintained their commitment to provide ample water to
protect the listed suckers.37 This decision had significant financial and political
consequences in years of litigation among stakeholders in the basin.38 The legal

31. U.S. DEP’T JUST, BENNETT V. SPEAR: BROADENING THE RIGHT TO SUE OVER ESA ISSUES (2015),
https://www.justice.gov/enrd/bennett-v-spear-broadening-right-sue-over-esa-issues.
32. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 154 (1997).
33. HOLLY D. DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH BASIN: MACHO LAW,
COMBAT BIOLOGY, AND DIRTY POLITICS 1-4 (ISLAND PRESS 2008).
34. ERIC A. STENE, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, KLAMATH PROJECT (1994),
https://www.usbr.gov/projects/pdf.php?id=129 (the Klamath Reclamation Project is the formal name for
the network of dams along the Klamath river constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation).
35. Nasa Earth Observatory, Drought in the Klamath River Basin, NASA (2001),
https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/1743/drought-in-the-klamath-river-basin (satellite imagery
courtesy of the Landsat 7 satellite which was launched by NASA and operated by the USGS documented
the extreme conditions in the Klamath Basin in 2000 and 2001).
36. Reed D. Benson, Giving Suckers (and Salmon) an Even Break: Klamath Basin water and the
Endangered Species Act, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 197 (2002). See also Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s
Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1248 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
37. Bennett v. Spear, 117 U.S. 1154, 1159 (1997).
38. See Susan M. Burke, Richard M. Adams & Wesley W. Wallender, Water banks and
environmental water demands: Case of the Klamath Project, 40 WATER RESOURCE RES. 1 (2004).
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battles that ensued clearly outlined the enforcement powers of the ESA and brought
an uncomfortable, but much needed, gut check to the irrigators of the Klamath Basin.
The drastic action of the USBR to stay in compliance with the ESA led to serious
economic consequences for the irrigators and their districts.39 This in turn created
incentives for the irrigators and irrigation districts, along with the agencies in charge
of delivery, to find a long-term solution to securing reliable water. Following the
2001 drought, a new BO in 2002 by the NMFS reinforced the need to dedicate more
water towards the protection of listed species in the Klamath.40
A 2002 BO by the NMFS in response to the USBR’s 2002 long-range BA
found that “if the Klamath Project were operated as the USBR intended, it would
cause jeopardy to the Coho and adversely modify its critical habitat.”41 The USBR’s
newly proposed flow regime consisted of maintaining instream flows depending on
the amount of precipitation the watershed received in a given year. In a dry year, the
USBR would provide less water to the river while in a wet year more water would
be released to reflect natural variation in flow.42 However, in determining that these
proposed actions by the USBR would potentially result in jeopardy of the Coho or
adversely modify critical habitat, NMFS produced RPAs. NMFS presented these
alternatives to the USBR’s proposed action as part of their obligation under the ESA
to prevent jeopardy or adverse modifications of critical habitat.43 Instead of
mimicking the natural flow of the river from year to year, the RPAs proposed by
NMFS consisted of a three phase plan to ramp up instream flow contributions by the
USBR, providing for the endangered Coho over a ten-year period.
NMFS’ RPAs44 were challenged in Pacific Coast Fed. Of Fishermen’s
Association (PCFFA) v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. The PCFFA contended that
the RPAs prepared by NMFS were arbitrary and capricious and in violation of the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and the ESA.45 While the final phase of the
proposed action would provide enough water for the salmon during hot summer
months and spawning runs, the first two phases—spanning eight of the ten years—
would provide little more than half of what was believed to be the minimum flow
requirement to avoid jeopardy. This was a problem because the Coho Salmon only
has a three-year life cycle.46 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California granted injunctive relief to the PCFFA, compelling USBR to halt
irrigation deliveries to increase the minimum instream flows for the Coho. Having
39. See Deborah Schoch, Dreams Dry Up in Klamath Basin, L.A. TIMES ENVTL. WRITER, July
23, 2001, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2001-jul-23-mn-25651-story.html.
40. See National Marine Fisheries Service, Klamath Project Operations, Biological Opinion (May
31, 2002).
41. Id. at 3; See also Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Assoc. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426
F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2005).
42. National Marine Fisheries Service, Klamath Project Operations, Biological Opinion (May 31,
2002) at 59.
43. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (1986)
44. National Marine Fisheries Service, Klamath Project Operations, Biological Opinion (May 31,
2002) at 52.
45. See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Assoc. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 138 F. Supp. 2d
1228, 1242-47 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
46. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Assoc. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082, 1095
(9th Cir. 2005).
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lost in the courtroom and fearing uncertainty when it came to annual water deliveries,
irrigators in the Klamath Basin soon realized that an agreement between parties was
the best chance they had at securing long-term reliable water for their crops.
Known as the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement or (KBRA), this
estimated $850 million attempt to restore a river through the removal of the J.C.
Boyle Dam, the Copco No.1 and No. 2 Dams, and the Iron Gate Dam, opens more
than 400 river miles of native spawning habitat for Coho Salmon. The KBRA would
also ensure higher water levels in Klamath Lake for the suckers.47 The KBRA is
meant to bring stability to the basin for irrigators previously struggling to know with
certainty if they would get reliable water deliveries due to ESA restrictions and senior
tribal water rights in the region.48 Perhaps more impressive than the estimated cost
or potential for restoration is that an agreement between these unlikely partners was
even possible. All told, the KBRA represents a restoration effort the likes of which
have never been attempted with respect to overall scale, complexity, and cost.49 If
successful, it could prove a model for other dam removal agreements being
contemplated around the country.
RECOGNITION OF TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS
The Lower Klamath Basin is home to three tribes: the Yurok, Karuk, and
Hoopa Valley. These three tribes depend on the annual migration of Coho Salmon
from the Pacific into the Klamath for both spiritual and nutritional sustenance. The
Upper Basin is home to a federation of tribes collectively called the Klamath
Tribes.50 The Klamath Tribes depend on the Lost River and Shortnose suckers for
much of their traditional diet.51 For generations, these tribes were the sole inhabitants
of the Klamath Basin, and relied on the seasonal spawning of salmon and the suckers
in the Klamath and its tributaries.52 Fish play a vital role in the lives of the Pacific
Northwest Tribes and in U.S. v. Winans, the Supreme Court of the United States
concluded that the tribe’s reliance on harvesting fish was “not much less necessary
to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed.”53 To understand
the incredible bounty of the Klamath before the irrigation and hydropower dams
blocked, diverted, and altered the hydrology, consider the fact that the Lower
Klamath Basin was once the third most productive salmon fishery in the lower 48

47. 1986-2006 USFWS, KLAMATH RIVER BASIN CONSERVATION AREA RESTORATION
ACTIVITIES REP. at 11.
48. See Jon Chown, Hoopa Tribe Fights Feds to Keep Salmon Alive, COURTHOUSE NEWS
SERVICE (August 3, 2016), https://www.courthousenews.com/hoopa-tribe-fights-feds-to-keep-salmonalive/ (statement of Hoopa Valley Tribal Council Chairman Ryan Jackson) (“These fish have been
essential to our culture, religion and economy since time immemorial.”); Will Houston, ‘A cultural
tragedy’: Karuk Tribe cuts salmon harvest to 200 fish, EURIKA TIMES-STANDARD (April 10, 2017,
8:57 PM), https://www.times-standard.com/2017/04/10/a-cultural-tragedy-karuk-tribe-cuts-salmonharvest-to-200-fish/.
49. Amos, supra note 14.
50. Hannah Gosnell & Erin Clover Kelly, Peace on the River? Social-Ecological Restoration and
Large Dam Removal in the Klamath Basin, USA, 3 WATER ALTERNATIVES 361, 367 (2010).
51. See generally id. at 378.
52. See id. at 367.
53. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
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states.54 In 1864, the Klamath Tribes entered into an agreement ceding over 8 million
hectares55 (ha) of their homeland to the U.S. Government in exchange for 800,00
hectares of reservation land, as well as reserved hunting and fishing rights on both
the reservation and ceded lands.56 These rights, particularly the water rights
associated with the fishing rights of the Klamath Tribes, came under heavy scrutiny
and legal challenge after the Tribes’ federal recognition was terminated in 1954 as
part of the federal assimilation policy.57 The disputes over the priority of the Klamath
Tribes’ water rights were initially settled in US v. Adair, wherein the court
determined that these rights were existent since “time immemorial.”58
The 1980’s brought further litigation to Klamath Basin stakeholders,
specifically between irrigators and the Upper Basin tribes. As Gosnell and Kelly
note, “The tension between tribes and irrigators grew as tribes asserted their treaty
rights through litigation demanding instream water for fish, and irrigators maintained
their rights to water and low-cost power rates. By the 1980s, the inherent disconnects
in the ecological and political system had become evident.”59 In 1986, the U.S.
government restored the Klamath Tribes’ federally recognized status, but none of the
ancestral lands that had been taken as part of the treaty were returned.60 Though the
Klamath Tribes lost much of their ancestral homeland with the original treaty and
the Klamath Termination Act (KTA), the KTA reserved their pre-treaty water and
fishing rights.61 The KTA’s reservation of water and fishing rights was critical for
the Klamath Tribes because without the instream flow requirement, the fish that had
historically supported the Tribes would be threatened by low flows in the river. The
Klamath Tribes’ water and fishing rights were further defined in 1999 in Klamath
Water Users v. Patterson when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the
irrigation project operator on the Klamath, in this case the Bureau of Reclamation
and PacifiCorp, had water rights that were junior to the rights of the Klamath
Tribes.62
The ruling in Klamath Water Users v. Patterson had a significant impact on
the outcome of the KBRA because it gave the Klamath Tribes real leverage with
regard to instream flow requirements in the Klamath Basin. Now, in addition to
operating their dams in accordance with the statutory obligations of the ESA, the
USBR and PacifiCorp were also constrained by the water rights held by the Klamath
Tribes from their treaty with the federal government.63 Gosnell and Kelly keenly note
that while receiving significant water rights in an adjudication and limiting irrigators
is a big win for the Upper Klamath tribes, that legal victory alone will not bring back
the fish to the Tribes. Rather, “a broader approach to restoration built on significant
54. Id.
55. Hectare - “A unit of area equal to 10,000 square meters.”. MERRIAM-WEBSTER Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2018).
56. Gosnell & Kelly supra note 50, at 367.
57. Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 33, at 64, 72.
58. United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336, 350 (D. Or. 1979) (Adair I).
59. Gosnell & Kelly, supra note 50, at 369.
60. Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 33, at 65.
61. Pub. L. No. 83-587, 68 Stat. 722 Sec.14 (1954).
62. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 1999).
63. Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 33, at 67.
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financial and institutional support from the government is necessary, and this support
is more easily accessible when the interests of all parties, especially irrigated
agriculture, are addressed.”64
The court rulings from U.S. v. Adair, and Klamath Water Users v. Patterson
helped solidify the water rights of the Klamath Tribes to the detriment of others.
However, the rights of the Lower Basin Tribes are still unclear and, to this day, still
await adjudication.
FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE
As mentioned earlier, FERC is responsible for reviewing and approving
permits and licenses for privately owned and operated hydropower dams on waters
of the United States.65 FERC draws its authority from the Federal Power Act (FPA),
which was originally intended to regulate hydropower projects that were not
federally funded.66 While the decision to grant or deny new licenses to PacifiCorp
on the four lower dams of the KHP rests solely with FERC, it lacks sole jurisdiction
in determining the requirements set forth in issuing those licenses.67
The BLM and USBR both have land and water interests in the Klamath
Basin, and both filed FPA section 4(e) conditions in response to PacifiCorp’s request
for relicensing.68 In keeping with their statutory mandate, FERC had to determine if
issuing a new license to PacifiCorp with the mandatory conditions provided by the
various agencies responsible for management of the reserved land and water
resources would detract from the intended mission and purpose of those reserved
lands.69 The USFWS and NMFS included additional mandatory conditions which
PacifiCorp would have to meet in order to be issued a new license.
USFWS and NMFS were involved in creating conditions for relicensing
which focused on: 1) ensuring the successful migration of Coho Salmon, 2)
improving spawning habitat, and 3) maintaining flows in the river and Upper
Klamath Lake for the Lost River and Shortnose suckers, along with other wildlife
resources in the Klamath.70 Maintaining instream flows and providing fish passage
between dams were critical features of the agency conditions because these two
requirements had the largest financial impacts on PacifiCorp’s decision to not pursue
relicensing. The conditions for relicensing listed by USFWS and NMFS came from
the FPA Section 18 which allows these federal agencies to issue additional
prescriptions for building a facility capable of moving fish both upstream and
downstream of a dam.71 Importantly, even after a license has been issued to the
64. Gosnell & Kelly, supra note 50, at 380.
65. 16 U.S.C. § 797 (2005).
66. See generally Federal Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C.).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2005).
68. Allen, supra note 15, at 447.
69. 16 U.S.C. § 797 (2005).
70. 16 U.S.C. § 803(j)(1) (1992) (“in order to adequately and equitably protect, mitigate damages to,
and enhance fish and wildlife (including related spawning grounds and habitat) affected by the
development, operation, and management of the project, each license issued under this subchapter shall
include such conditions for such protection, mitigation, and enhancement.”).
71. 16 U.S.C. § 811 (2005).
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operator, USFWS or NMFS can amend or adopt a Section 18 prescription if they
determine that the original prescription is not having the desired effect.72 To date,
neither of these agencies have acted on this reserved authority in further amending a
license prescription after issuing it. That being said, the potential for an agency issued
mandate for revised improvements to fish passage structures has surely kept the
occasional dam operator up at night.
Section 18 prescriptions become even more crucial when FERC is
considering relicensing of a dam located on a river that is home to threatened or
endangered species.73 Seeing as the Klamath river is home to several endangered fish
species, USFWS and NMFS were allowed to create reasonable and prudent
alternatives or measures (RPAs or RPMs).74 These alternatives come from the
Incidental Take Statement of Section 7 of the ESA and are prescribed to help limit
the chances of an incidental take of a listed species. While FERC doesn’t have to
include the RPAs or RPMs when listing requirements, they often treat these
conditions as mandatory because of their obligation to protect and contribute to the
continued recovery of threatened and endangered species under Section 7(a)(2) of
the ESA.75 By including the RPAs and RPMs, FERC also strengthens their position
and administrative record in the event of a legal challenge that argues the
Commission was arbitrary and capricious in their final rule. This means that if the
dam operator receives the new license and then goes on to place any of the
endangered or threatened species into jeopardy,76 or perform a taking of any
endangered species that is beyond the scope of any incidental take permits, the
operators of the facility would have difficulty showing they were not properly
informed of the risk and suggested mitigation plans by FERC.
In addition to all of the conditions and prescriptions provided by federal
agencies in the final EIS, the states of California and Oregon also had the opportunity
to include water quality standards as part of their mandate through the Clean Water
Act (CWA).77 In particular, Section 401 of the CWA provides states the authority to
require any private dam operator seeking a federal license to “discharge into
navigable water,” to be granted certification of compliance with state water quality
standards.78 Without the state’s approval to discharge, FERC is not able to issue a
new license and the dam operator, PacifiCorp, is left with a group of dams costing
millions of dollars per year to maintain and no ability to use them for power
generation.79
72. See Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 32 F.3d 1165 (7th Cir. 1994). The Hydropower
Reform Coalition notes that even though NMFS and USFWS possess this reserved authority, to date they
have never exercised this authority to alter a fishway prescription following a relicensing.
73. See Amos, supra note 14, at 23 (“In 2004, there was new scientific data introduced when federal
scientists concluded that salmon formerly spawned in the upper basin, upstream of the dams.”).
74. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (1988); 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.02, 402.14(i)(1) (2019).
75. 16 U.S.C., § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
76. Endangered Species Act § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988) (“Under the ESA, jeopardy
occurs when an action is reasonably expected, directly or indirectly, to diminish a species’ numbers,
reproduction, or distribution so that the likelihood of survival and recovery in the wild is appreciably
reduced.”).
77. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1987).
78. Allen, supra note 15, at 431.
79. Id.

272

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 60.2

Upon receiving the conditions set forth by the various federal agencies and
California and Oregon, FERC compiled a Final Environmental Impact Statement
which weighed the economic benefits of the lower four dams against the
environmental impacts of the facilities’ continued operation, and in particular, the
impacts on the migrating salmon.80 The four lower dams on the Klamath had blocked
hundreds of river miles of historic spawning habitat from the annual migration of
salmon from sea to stream.81 In summary, this final report concluded that the four
lower dams on the Klamath were no longer environmentally or economically viable
facilities unless Pacificorp was prepared to incorporate extensive structural and
operational changes.82 Though FERC was prepared to issue a new license to
PacifiCorp, FERC also considered the option of removing the four lower dams in the
final EIS.83 The immense scope and cost of completing alterations to the dams to
reach compliance with the mandatory conditions set forth in the license were simply
uneconomical for PacifiCorp.84 Faced with these hefty requirements for relicensing,
PacifiCorp came to the table with hopes of reaching a settlement.
ENTER THE KBRA
The Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement was born out of a financial and
environmental reckoning. The agreement mainly consists of requirements and
conditions focused on three goals: 1) stabilize and continue reintroducing fish into
the watershed with the hope of supporting inland and coastal communities interested
in annually harvesting salmon; 2) maintain the infrastructure required for consistent
water and power for irrigators and National Wildlife Refuges and; 3) cultivate
sustainability throughout the Klamath Basin while mitigating any negative effects of
removing the four lower dams.85 These three goals are fairly site specific and thus
more difficult to include in any foundational principles that could be transferred or
implemented in any other dam removal project outside of the Klamath Basin.
However, the agreement’s framework, which allowed invested parties from polar

80. Id. at 449 (“In its Final Environmental Impact Statement, FERC weighed the costs of the section
4(e) conditions and the section 18 prescriptions against the benefits of energy generation at the KHP.
Under the renewed license, the KHP would generate an average of only 533,879 MWh of electricity
annually - down twenty-five percent from the annual average of 716,820 MWh. FERC projected the
annual value of the power generated by the KHP after imposing the conditions and prescriptions to be
about $25 million. After complying with the mandatory conditions and prescriptions, FERC estimated the
total annual cost of operating the KHP to be over $46 million, thus projecting the net annual loss to
PacifiCorp of operating the KHP under the new conditions and prescriptions to be more than $20 million.
After mitigating its environmental impacts, the KHP would no longer be economically viable. The FPA’s
mandatory federal conditioning authorities thus forced the parties to plan for dam removal.”).
See also Notice of Availability of the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Klamath
Hydroelectric Project, 72 Fed. Reg. 9754 (issued Nov. 16, 2007).
81. See Klamath Dams Removal, CAL. TROUT, https://caltrout.org/projects/klamath-dams-removal
(last visited May 9, 2020).
82. See Executive Summary, Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Klamath Hydroelectric
Project, 72 Fed. Reg. 9754 (issued Nov. 16, 2007).
83. Id.
84. Amos, supra note 14, at 24-25.
85. Allen, supra note 15, at 453.
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opposite perspectives to reach consensus, is transferrable to projects outside the
region.
The Klamath Settlement Group86 (KSG) announced the finalized KBRA on
January 15, 2008.87 In short, the KBRA strategy was to transfer water from one use
to another. In doing so, the KBRA would leave more water in the river as instream
flows for anadromous88 fish, while curtailing upstream irrigation diversions. Crucial
to the success of the KBRA, however, was the removal of the four lower dams, which
required compliance by PacifiCorp. The KBRA required a separate “Hydropower
Agreement” between the signatories of the KBRA and PacifiCorp to remove the
dams.89 The success of the KBRA hinged on the Hydropower Agreement, as it could
not be ratified without PacifiCorp binding themselves to a final agreement for dam
removal.90 More than fifty stakeholders signed the KBRA on February 18, 2010,
nearly ten years after the start of the process.91 What made this agreement special
was not only its outcome, but its implementation. The KBRA called for the creation
of a governing body, called the Klamath Basin Coordinating Council (the Council),
to ensure the implementation of the various stages of the agreement.92 While the
Council must operate within the boundaries of existing government authority, it was
given the oversight authority on almost $1 billion in spending during the first ten
years of the project.93 The Council’s authority allows it to move quickly and
efficiently from various parts of the restoration project and divert funds in an
expedited manor to contractors.94
Requiring PacifiCorp to sign a separate agreement for the removal of the
four lower dams is a feature of the KBRA process that has potential to be a common
framework in other dam removal projects. Known as the Klamath Hydropower
Settlement Agreement (KHSA), this agreement focused almost exclusively on the
removal of the four lower dams on the Klamath. One way in which the KHSA might
revolutionize and expedite other dam removals is its potential to provide incentives
to the current owners of the dam by offering protection from any liability that might
arise during the deconstruction of the dam.95 PacifiCorp avoids liability through
federal legislation by transferring each dam to a “dam removal entity” (DRE) that
86. For more information on the KSG, see Dan Bacher, Klamath Settlement Group Releases
Proposed
Restoration
Agreement.
INDYBAY
(Jan.
15,
2008),
https://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2008/01/15/18472655.php
87. Allen, supra note 15, at 452. Klamath Settlement Group – This was a task force comprised of
state, federal, tribal, local environmental, agricultural, and fishing representatives, as well as landowners
from the Klamath Basin and surrounding areas.
88. Anadromous, Merriam-Webster (“ascending rivers from the sea for breeding”).
89. Allen, supra note 15, at 453.
90. Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement for the Sustainability of Public and Trust Resources and
Affected Communities 4,5 (Feb. 18, 2010).
91. Id. at 1-3.
92. Id. at C.2.
93. Id.
94. On April 25, 2019, the KRRC confirmed that Kiewit Infrastructure West Co., of Fairfield,
California was awarded the contract for devising project designs. Capital Press also reported that in
addition to creating the initial project outlines, that Kiewit will be responsible for demolition of the four
dams pending state and federal approval.
95. Allen, supra note 15, at 454.
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will assume liability in their contract with the KBCC in removing the facility.96 The
DRE is also responsible for obtaining vital permits, securing funding, and defending
liability claims that might be brought to court in the event of damages reported during
the removal process.97 In assuming the risks of removal, the DRE must consider the
potential for the release of hazardous substances that might be stored in the sediment
from behind the dam. To some, this might seem like a way for PacifiCorp to avoid
the responsibilities associated with the deconstruction, but in practice, it can be a
useful strategy when the owners of the dam are unwilling to take on removal due to
the liability involved.
The KHSA further entices dam owners by allowing them to continue selling
power to customers during the removal process.98 However, dam owners cannot
abuse this monetary incentive by stalling the permitting process. The opportunity to
generate revenue during the deconstruction is restricted in part because the DRE, not
PacifiCorp, is responsible for obtaining the necessary permits for removal.99 If
PacifiCorp was responsible for obtaining permits for removal while still being
allowed to make money off of the generation of electricity, there would be no
incentive for PacifiCorp to move quickly through the permitting process. Allowing
the DRE to function as the party responsible for obtaining necessary permits means
that the removal process will not be delayed on account of dam owners wanting to
spin the turbines for a few more months or years.100
The Klamath River Renewal Corporation (KRRC) is the specific DRE
tasked with taking ownership of the four PacifiCorp dams.101 A Non-Profit, KRRC
has a diverse leadership with expertise in natural resource management, sustainable
food processing and trade, environmental science, water law, tribal relations, and
fisheries science.102 After extensive field work and reporting, the KRRC submitted
the Definite Plan for the Lower Klamath Project on June 28, 2018 to FERC.103 This
2,300-page document details not only the project design and various dam removals,
but also the reservoir restoration and other activities associated with postdeconstruction.104 FERC requires this information in order to process the transfer of
the dam ownership licenses from PacifiCorp to the KRRC. Importantly, the Definite
Plan maintains the promise of transparency to all stakeholders which has been
present throughout the KBRA-KHSA process.
The KHSA highlights that the agreement’s intention is not to punish
PacifiCorp by making them deal with the consequences of removal. Rather, the goal

96. Id.at 463.
97. Id. at 463.
98. Id. at 464.
99. Id. at 466.
100. Id. at 464.
101. See Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement, § 7.4.2 (Nov. 30, 2016)
http://www.klamathrenewal.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/2016.12.31-Executed-and-AmendedFinal-KHSA.pdf.
102. See KLAMATH RIVER RENEWAL CORP., MEET THE KRCC LEADERSHIP (last visited May 3, 2020),
http://www.klamathrenewal.org/about-the-krrc/leadership/.
103. KLAMATH RIVER RENEWAL CORP., DEFINITE PLAN FOR THE LOWER KLAMATH PROJECT (last
visited May 3, 2020), http://www.klamathrenewal.org/definite-plan/.
104. Id.
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is the same, as made clear by the very different Revegetation Plans for Iron Gate
Reservoir and J.C. Boyle Reservoir.108 Without proper riparian109 restoration on the
previously inundated sections, the positive impacts of dam removal might not be felt
downstream due to increased siltation and turbidity during high flow events.110
Along with shoreline restoration, returning the riverbed to a habitable condition for
fish and benthic111 organisms is a vital part of the process. River restoration entails
rebuilding the natural sinuosity112 of the river, connecting the main channel with the
primary and secondary flood plains, as well as providing fish with adequate holding
pools, ambush habitat, and spawning areas.113 After decades of siltation behind these
dams, the river will have to slowly erode away silt and other deposits to reconnect
with the cobble and bedrock that naturally make up the stream bed.
HOW MIGHT THE KBRA-KHSA INFLUENCE FUTURE DAM
REMOVALS?
The story of the Klamath River’s restoration agreement offers an
opportunity to create a template for other projects. The bullet points of the KBRAKHSA Basics are: 1) continuous widespread stakeholder involvement; 2) combining
dam removal with watershed and river restoration efforts; 3) building trust between
invested parties; 4) recognizing the long-term value and benefits gained by all
stakeholders associated with a healthy river; 5) creating governing bodies that can
oversee the funding and progress of the removal and restoration; and 6) creating
incentives for dam owners by transferring liability and permitting to willing parties
so the process does not slow down as a result of attempting to further economic gains.
overall positive thing for the environment, it still triggers all of those statutes and implicates another set
of environmental concerns. The process of taking a dam out is as robust as the process of putting one in,
in terms of evaluating those impacts. In that Condit video, which I encourage you to go watch, they
gathered up all the salmon before they blew it in order to try to protect them. Lots of trap-and-haul
operations go on to try to have the least amount of environmental impact on the deconstruction process.
There is a lot of fine legal work being done around all of those compliance efforts in the deconstruction
process as well. When you see some of those videos, it is no small engineering feat. It is no small feat in
terms of environmental compliance as well.”).
108. See U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, DETAILED PLAN FOR DAM REMOVAL – KLAMATH RIVER
DAMS
(2012),
https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/water_quality_cert/docs/lower_kla
math_ferc14803/krrc_detail_1.pdf.
109. Riparian, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (last updated Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/riparian.
110. LOWRY, R. WILLIAM, DAM POLITICS: RESTORING AMERICA’S RIVERS 61–2 (2003) (describing
the benefits of dam removal and habitat restoration, for time-lapse animation sequences depicting
restoration of the Klamath River see American Rivers, Envisioning a Restored Klamath River, available
at
http://www.americanrivers.org/ourwork/restoring-rivers/dams/projects/envisioning-a-restoredklamath.html (2010)).
111. Benthic, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2018) (“of,
relating to, or occurring at the bottom of a body of water”).
112. Sinuosity, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2018)
(“the quality or state of being sinuous, of a serpentine or wavy form”).
113. Bill Zeedyk & Van Clothier, Let the Water do the work: Induced meandering, an evolving method
for restoring incised channels 14 (2009) (discussing the importance of “inducing meander” in river
restoration as a way to cultivate riparian and aquatic habitat).
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These elements of the KBRA-KHSA have the potential to influence dam
removal and restoration efforts around the country. Applying these KBRA-KHSA
Basics to other projects will only be successful if the parties involved are able to
acknowledge the harm of polarizing tactics, and refrain from using them in these
very emotional disputes. Heavy litigation between parties, increased regulation, and
political promises may have ruled the day in the past. However, these strategies only
served to highlight the problems in the Klamath Basin and elsewhere while never
providing a realistic long term remedy.114 As Gosnell and Kelly note, “The success
of the KBRA represents a sort of ‘moving beyond’ the narrow confines of ESA
regulation and litigation, in favor of negotiation and reliance on the federal-tribal
trust responsibilities to move toward species recovery and implementation of other
necessary social and economic goals.”115
While there are factors that are site specific to the Klamath Basin that make
the KBRA truly unique, the four dams proposed for removal share a common thread
with many others around the country in that they require federal relicensing under
FERC. In the case of the Klamath, the catalyst for finally reaching an agreement for
removal was the process of relicensing by FERC.116 Yes, there were multiple BOs
and BAs, statutory obligations, extreme droughts, water rights adjudications, court
cases, and subsequent rulings that moved the needle back and forth on the issue of
water management in the basin. I argue, however, that it was the timing and eventual
issuance of a revised license with prescriptions to PacifiCorp that compounded these
orbiting influences into the tangible agreements that are the KBRA-KHSA.
Future attempts to initiate a removal agreement for a federally licensed dam
or set of dams could benefit from expending resources and manpower at key
moments, like during the dam’s relicensing. The process of relicensing a single dam
by FERC has been proposed by others as having great promise in allowing for a more
comprehensive, basin-wide review.117 FERC could make it common practice to
include reopener clauses in new licenses that would act to align the timing of
licensing proceedings throughout a river basin.118 Again, this may not suit every
future attempt at dam removal and restoration. However, it would be a shame if the
lessons learned and tactics applied on the Klamath were never used as a framework
in drafting agreements for other watersheds that could benefit from dam removal
followed by riparian and aquatic habitat restoration. Critics of the joint agreement
such as the Klamath Conservation Partners (KCP) have noted that combining
removal with restoration only complicates and slows down the process.119 However,
I agree with Allen that “dam removal provides a unique opportunity for
comprehensive river restoration because the key governmental parties are each at the
negotiating table and focused on the issue. Further, to achieve the most
environmental benefit as soon as possible, dam removal should be followed by
114. See Gosnell, & Kelly supra note 50.
115. Id.
116. See FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATION COMM’N., Complete List of Active Licenses,
https://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2018).
117. See Dave Owen & Colin Apse, Trading Dams, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1043, 1090 (2012).
118. Id.
119. KLAMATH
CONSERVATION
PARTNERS,
Guidance
Statement,
http://www.oregonwild.org/waters/klamath/a-vision-for-the-klamath-basin/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2018).
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habitat restoration.”120 Taking advantage of the dam relicensing process and using
these six principles to organize, communicate, and eventually draft agreements could
dramatically improve the experience and outcome of dam removal and restoration in
other basins.
SUMMARY
There is no easy out when discussing the solution to aging dams. The
argument that these facilities still provide reliable energy production, flood and
sediment control, and recreational opportunities to communities throughout the
United States is valid. However, there is a growing need for species conservation and
the long-term economic potential that comes from the ecosystem services provided
by healthy rivers. Dams are built and designed with materials that have relatively
short life spans and capacity. They fill up with sediment and slowly degrade
ecosystem services such as reliable, healthy food sources that have provided
sustenance for tribes in the Pacific Northwest for millennia.
The Klamath River is a prime example of how these two hemispheres of
thought collided repeatedly, seemingly incapable of understanding the other side’s
point of view. That is, until there was a change in the way stakeholders and regulators
went about approaching the problem. The KBRA-KHSA Basics created a new form
of negotiation for one of the most sensitive topics in the Western United States. From
the beginning, transparency, communication, trust building, and incentivizing were
the building blocks of the agreement. Avoiding a zero-sum scenario ensured that
when parties left the negotiating table, they felt that their claims, their needs, and
maybe most importantly, their livelihoods had been recognized by the other groups
and not dismissed. Future agreements might benefit from reflecting this KBRAKHSA style of negotiation and create agreements which address the interests and
concerns of stakeholders who oppose the removal of the dam(s). Ignoring or
minimizing those concerns is what polarizes and eventually defeats any attempt at
removal and restoration. Taking advantage of relicensing periods to collaborate and
better understand the pros and cons of dam removal can serve as the catalyst for
driving agreements forward. The relicensing phase also provides an opportunity to
look at the watershed as a whole and determine if multiple structures should be
removed to obtain a desired recovery.
The Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement and Klamath Hydropower
Settlement Agreement serve as examples of how dam removal projects, followed by
riparian and aquatic restoration can be accomplished jointly to the benefit of all.
Plans for removal are slated to begin in early 2020 and there are sure to be
complications, and unforeseen problems during the process. In these moments it will
be easy to feel as if the task at hand is unattainable. Keeping these bumps in the road
in perspective and realizing the long-term benefits of these agreements will be crucial
to their success. Soon we will see if the symbol of American pride, and progress can
be realized not with concrete and rebar, but with free-flowing rivers, renewed sources
of healthy food, and the recovery of threatened and endangered species.

120. Allen, supra note 15 at p.456

